Modelling consumer behavior by inverse demand functions by Fuchs-Seliger, Susanne
Theoretical Economics Letters, 2013, 3, 229-232 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/tel.2013.34039 Published Online August 2013 (http://www.scirp.org/journal/tel) 
Modelling Consumer Behavior by Inverse Demand 
Functions 
Susanne Fuchs-Seliger 
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre Karlsruher Institut für Technologie, Karlsruher, Deutschland 
Email: susanne.fuchs-seliger@kit.edu 
 
Received June 4, 2013; revised July 4, 2013; accepted July 18, 2013 
 
Copyright © 2013 Susanne Fuchs-Seliger. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
ABSTRACT 
In this article a model of consumer behavior will be developed, based on preferences on the price space reflecting the 
individual’s willingness to pay for certain quantities of commodities under the supposition that the individual is re- 
stricted to his or her income. Firms offer certain amounts of commodities at the market and consumers react to these 
offers by their willingness to pay. Existence and continuity of the inverse demand function describing consumer’s be- 
havior under appropriate conditions will be shown. Furthermore, differences between a model of consumer behavior 
based on preferences on the commodity space and that which is based on preferences on the price space will be pointed 
out. 
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1. Introduction 
We will consider inverse demand functions which assign, 
to every commodity bundle x, those market price com- 
binations p the individual is willing to pay for x at most 
when income M prevails. The demand function, defined 
on prices and income, and the related inverse demand 
function, defined on commodities offered at the market 
and on the individual’s income, are dual concepts de- 
scribing consumer behavior. According to its definition, 
a demand function associates with every budget set   ,B p M x X px M  
Inverse demand functions often are a convenient tool 
for modelling market behavior in the presence of mono- 
polistic firms ([1], p. 326). If the firms have information 
about the individual’s preferences on prices, then they 
will know that he or she cannot accept prices higher than 
a certain limit. 
The analysis in this article will be based on preference 
relations on prices instead of indirect utility functions. 
Therefore, a more general framework for inverse demand 
will be established. We will introduce axioms concerning 
consumer’s preferences on the price space IR n . Based 
on these axioms properties of the inverse demand func- 
tion will be deduced. For comparison, we will also point 
out the difference between a model of consumer behavior 
based on preferences on the commodity space and that 
which is based on the price space. 
 , that commodity bundle 
which according to the preferences of the individual is 
the one he or she prefers to the other ones available in the 
given budget set. From the point of duality, according to 
the individual’s preferences with regard to prices, the 
inverse demand function points out that price com- 
bination the individual would spend for x at most, given 
income M . As an example we may consider the fol- 
lowing one: the individual is not willing to pay more than 
two Euro for one pound of bred. Then he can afford to 
buy cheese for not more than three Euro and ham for two 
Euro. In total the individual cannot spend more than 
seven Euro for these goods. Evidently, he would be 
happy if these commodities were cheaper. As another 
example we can fancy a market where carpets are sold 
and the agent is not willing to pay more than a certain 
amount of money for a special carpet. 
2. Hypotheses on Consumer’s Preferences 
Modelling consumer’s behavior we will assume the 
following hypotheses: 
(P1)  is a relation on the strictly positive n-dimen- 
sional vector space 

IR n . Every  represents  IR
np 
an income-normalized price vector, i.e. Pp
M
 , where  
IRnP   are the market prices, i  is the price of one 
unit of the good 
P
ix , and M is the income of the indi- 
vidual, where . 0M
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
S. FUCHS-SELIGER 230 
(P2)  is transitive and complete1. 
(P3)  is continuous, i.e. 
(P3.1)  0IR np p  p  is closed in  for every  IR n
0 IR np   (lower semicontinuity), 
(P3.2)  0IRnp p p 
2
 is closed in  for every  IR n
0 IR np   (upper semicontinuity).  
(P4) , where   is the asym- 
metric part of 2. 
1 2 1p p p p  

(P5) Let , IRk k np p  , be a sequence such that  
0lim 0k
k
p p   , where 0 I , and R
n
 IR np 
k
. Then  
there exists a positive integer  such that  for 
all . 
N p  p
k N
The term  means: the consumer either prefers 
the price vector  to  or he is indifferent between 
them. (P4) should be interpreted as follows: if the 
individual can achieve a commodity bundle 
p p
p p
x  in the 
price situation  at which all of the commodity prices 
are lower than those in the price situation , then the 
individual prefers  to . 
1p
1p
2p
2p
(P5) can be interpreted as: if the prices of some goods 
turn to 0, then the value of the whole price systems 
increases and becomes greater than any given positive 
price system . However, the value may not converge 
to infinity, but to a point of saturation. (P5) is a regularity 
condition for proving Theorem 1 and 3. In reality no 
market price turns to 0. 
p
3. Inverse Demand Functions 
Let us consider a commodity space  and the 
price space . Then the mapping  
, is called an “inverse demand 
correspondence’’. If  is single-valued, then  is 
called an inverse demand function.  denotes the 
power set of . 
IR nX 
IR2
n
IR n , n b
IR n
IR: 2b X x b x
B x
   b
By  we will denote all those income-normalized 
price vectors at which x  is available, i.e. 
   IR 1nB x p px   . It has been shown (see [2],  
Theorem 1, pp. 241-242), that the correspondence  
   IR: IR 2 , IR 1nnB B x p    n px  , is lower he-  
micontinuous. 
The inverse demand function corresponds to the in- 
direct utility function being the dual counterpart to the 
(direct) utility function to which the demand function 
corresponds [3]. Given an indirect utility function v or, 
more generally, a preference relation   on the (in- 
come-normalized) price space , we will ask when 
the equality 
IR n
    IR : ,np p B x p B x p p          (1) 
holds. Then we can define an inverse demand corre- 
spondence IR : 2
n
b X   such that        IRn p B : b x p x p B x p p      . Thus,  b x  points out special real price vectors IR nP   at 
income M of those price vectors, which are at the  
individual’s disposal so that Px ≤ M, i.e. 1Ppx x
M
  ,  
holds (for ) when commodity bundle x is 
available at the market. 
0M 
By interpretation,  b x  represents the set of all those 
income-normalized price vectors which are most un- 
favourable in the budget set  according to the in- 
dividual’s opinion. Therefore, producers of the com- 
modity bundle 
 B x
x  should know that the individual will 
not accept prices still worse than those indicated by  b x . In case the profit maximizing firms are content 
with those prices, a market equilibrium can be attained. 
In view of (P4)  b x  consists of the highest prices the 
individual is willing to pay at most for x  under the 
restriction that he or she is limitated by his or her 
income. 
If  b x
IR:
 satisfies equality (1), then we will also call 
2
n
b X 
IR

X
 as to be “consistent with ”. The above 
definition of consistency can be considered as the dual 
counterpart to rationality of demand correspondences 
with respect to a given relation  on the commodity 
space 

R
n
 , i.e.: 
      : ,h p x X x B p y B p xRy       
where 
   1 , IR .nB p z X pz p        
For comparison, if we start describing consumer be- 
havior based on preferences on the commodity space, 
then one can impose the following hypotheses (A1) to 
(A4) on the commodity space X , and on the relation 
 on R X : 
(A1) , is supposed to be a closed set 
of alternatives. 
IR , nX X  
(A2)  is a reflexive relation on R X . 
(A3)  is upper semicontinuous on R X , i.e.       R x y y X yRx    is closed in X  for all x X .  
(A4) For all     zRy, z X P z y   y X  is 
supposed to be convex and non-empty.  
Then       : h p x x B p y B p xRy        
(see [4], p. 303). 
We can realize that these hypotheses are quite mild. 
Even transitivity and completeness of the individual’s 
preferences on the commodity space are not assumed. 
The proof has been done by the help of the finite inter- 
section property since the budget sets  1 , IR :np p p p p     p . 
2 1    1 , IRnB p x X px p       , are compact. How-  2p p  means, 1 2 i ip p i n   . 
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ever, since    IR 1nB x p px    is not compact,  
the finite intersection property cannot be applied for 
showing , and we therefore need different 
assumptions. 
 b x  
If we assume (P1) to (P5), then  follows. 
This will be shown by the next theorem. 
 b x  
Theorem 1 Let the commodity space be the IR n  
and assume (P1) to (P5). Then for all ,  IR nx 
      IR :nb x p p B x p B x p p       .  
Proof. 
By assumption  is a complete, transitive and con- 
tinuous relation on . Therefore, by Debreu’s re- 
presentation theorem [5], it can be represented by a 
continuous function  such that  
 . The function  
will be interpreted as an indirect utility function. In view 
of (P4)  is decreasing3. It suffices to show now, that 
for all ,  

vv p 
IR n
: IR n , , IR  IR np p  p p v p  
v
IR nx 
v
 
        IR :
.
n
b x
p p B x p B x v p v p       
 
 
Since  is decreasing   v p
  
 
 
inf 1, IR
inf 1, IR
inf .
n
n
v p px p
v p px p
M x


 
  

  
We will now continue strictly according to the proof of 
Theorem 3 in [2], pp. 242-243. For abbreviation set  infs M x . One can show that in view of the 
continuity of  and of (P4) there exists  v p IR np   
such that . Constructing a sequence    sv p
1 , 1ks s k
k
    , it follows that for every ks  there  
exists pk such that  and 1kp x   k ks v p s  . Since 
kp  is bounded there exists a convergent subsequence  
of kp , denoted by jkp  such that 0
j
p plim
jk  , 
and  lim lim 2j jk kj j ps v p s s v          . Hence, there 
does not exist a positive integer  such that N
2
jk pp
   
for all . Application of (P5) to this result implies 
. In view of the continuity of  we obtain  
j N
 jk
0 0p  v
 0lim
j
v p v p  , and therefore . Since   0v p s
 infs M x  and since 0 1p x  , we have  
0 , Ip p p   R n  such that . Therefore 1p x
        0 IR  : np p p B x p B x v p v p        .  
Hence,  b x  
IR n
 and thus  can be well defined for 
all 
b
x  . 
This concludes our proof. 
If the inverse demand function is based on an indirect 
utility function satisfying the following condition ([2], p. 
240): 
(γ) for every sequence  
 0, IR , 0k k n k kp p p p v p           , then  
(P5) follows. Hence,    is stronger than (P5). 
Lemma 2 Consider a continuous indirect utility func- 
tion : v IR IRn    satisfying condition   . Then 
the corresponding preference relation  defined by    :p p v p v p   , satisfies (P5). 
Proof. 
Given a sequence of price vectors kp , IRk np  ,  
such that , and a . By 0lim 0k
k
p p   IR
np     it  
follows  v p k . Since  and since    IRv p  kv p  , there exsists a positive integer N such that  
for all , k N    kv p v p , and hence , con- 
cluding our proof. 
kp  p
According to (P5) the indirect utility function  may 
converge to a finite value when . There- 
fore, condition (P5) is weaker than 
v
0 0kp p   . 
4. Some Properties of the Inverse Demand 
Correspondence 
It will now be shown that  is upper 
hemicontinuous. We will characterize upper hemicon- 
tinuity by sequences ([6], pp. 262-263, Theorem A III. 1, 
part (b) of the proof, where compact-valuedness of the 
correspondence is not needed, see also [7], p. 532, 
Theorem 16.17): 
: IR 2
nRnb  
Let , where , then : 2TF S  , IRnS T  F  is called 
“upper hemicontinuous” at 0x S , if for every sequence  
kx  with 0lim
k
kx x   and for every sequence 
ky   
with  ky F x k , there exists a convergent subsequence  
of ,k kjy y , such that lim
j s called  
upper hemicontinuous if it is upper hemicontinuous at 
 0kjy y F x  . F i
every x S . 
Theorem 3 If the relation  satisfies (P1) to (P5) 
an

d if : IR 2
nRnb    is consistent with  , then b  is 
upper h  
Proof. 
emicontinuous.
Let , IRk k nx x  , be a sequence such that  
lim IR
k
xk nx   
n
s, for any k  and for all  . Thu
IRp   such that 1kp x   it f lows, kp p
3The (income normalized) indirect utility function v is called decreasing
ol , where  if    p p v p v p    , for all . , IR np p 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
S. FUCHS-SELIGER 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
232 
kp b x k  and kp p p . If 1 , ,k k n   kp  is not  
bounded, th ust exist a pos tegeen there m itive in r j n   
and a sequence kjp  such that lim
k
jp   . Sincej   
, we obtain  for somelim 0j jk x x  
k k k 1l lp x   INm   
and for all ing  l  m , contradict 1k  . Hencekp x kp
nece  
e  O
 
is bounded, herefore, taking uence if - 
ssary, lim kp p   . In order to obtain a contradiction,  
and t  a subseq
k
suppos bviously, there exists 0p  . IRnp   such  
that 1 . Sp x ince lim k
k
x x    there also exists an inte-  
ger such that1 0N    for all 1 : 1kk N p x   . Hence, 
by c cy, onsisten kp p . On th 5) yields 
the existence of an integer 2 0N   such that for all 
2k N , 
e other side, (P
kp p . Take 1 2ma ,N N N , then for all x
k  N , kp p  and kp ction. Hence, p , a co
 p b x

n that 
ntradi
 show Therefore, let us 
co
e exists a positive integer  such that 
2) 
0 . 
Now, it will be
p 
  . 
ˆ 1px  . I
wo 
nsider ˆ IR np   such that n order to obtain 
that p  ve to consider t cases. 
1) . 
pˆ , we ha
1pˆx
Hen erce, th N

  ,
pˆx
k N . 
k
1k   for all k N , and therefore ˆkp p , for all 
In view of r semicontinuity o
ˆp p   . 
 lowe f   
lim
k
p
ˆ 1px  . 
 Let , IRl l nq q  , be a sequence such that  
 and qu
does exist. e hav
 we thus ob
Corollary: In t
re
ˆlim
k
p 
lq 1 . Obviously, such a selq x  ence  
 Since w e 1l kq x   for some positive in- 
teger Nˆ  and for all k   obtain k lp q . By 
lower micontinuity th plies, lim k lp . In  
Nˆ , we
s im
 
se i
k
q p 
view of upper semicontinuity of  tain ,
udˆp p  . Hence  p b x  . This concl es our proof  
 of Lemma 2 and the previous he light
marks it follows: given a continuous and decreasing 
indirect utility function v : IR IRn   satisfying con- 
dition   , then the inverse espondence b : 
IR
nn   , defined by   
 demand corr
IR2   B x v p    , for alv p   l p B x 
upper hemicontinuous. 
concavity of  implies single- 
va or
b x p  is 
Finally, since strict 
luedness of the inverse demand c respondence we 
immediately obtain the following theorem. Preliminarily, 
remember that strict concavity is defined as follows: let 
Y  be a convex set, and let ,p p Y  with p p , 
n: the
  0p p p p     ,1 . 
d let it be 
1 ,p  
P1) to (P5)Theorem 4 Let  satisfy (  an
n 

strictly concave, the
a)  b x  is single-valued if nsistent b  is co with  , 
and b IRn n: IR   is a continuous function,  
b)   etic4, then b  is homogene if  is homoth ous of 
degree 1 . 
Note, at th  upper hemicontinuity nt
5. Summary 
analysis, a fo  for m  
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